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Abstract
The theory of games against nature relies on complete preferences among all conceivable
acts, i.e. among all potential assignments of consequences to states of nature (case 1).
Yet most decision problems call for choosing an element from a limited set of acts. And
in games of strategy, the set of strategies available to a player is given and not amenable
to artiﬁcial extensions. In “Assessing Strategic Risk” (CORE DP 2005/20), R.J Aumann
and J.H. Dr` eze extend the basic result of decision theory (maximisation of subjectively
expected utility) to situations where preferences are deﬁned only for a given set of acts,
and for lotteries among these and sure consequences (case 2). In this paper, we provide
a similar extension for two other situations: those where only the set of optimal elements
from a given set of acts is known (case 3); and those where only a single optimal act is
known (case 4). To these four cases correspond four nested sets of admissible subjective
probabilities over the states or the opponent’s strategies, namely a singleton in case 1 and
increasing sets in cases 2-4. The results for cases 3 and 4 also deﬁne the extent to which
1This paper is an outgrowth of joint research with R.J. Aumann (2005), and I regard it as joint work.
Because I wrote up the paper on my own (after some e-mail exchanges), Aumann tactfully declined to
appear as co-author. I had to agree, reluctantly, and I thank him warmly for the stimulating cooperation.
I have also beneﬁtted from helpful discussions with Jean-Franois Mertens. I assume sole responsibility for
the contents.
2CORE, Universit´ e catholique de Louvainsubjective probabilities must be speciﬁed in order to solve a given decision problem or play
a given game.
11 Introduction
The standard model of decision theory, as used e.g. by Savage (1954) or Anscombe and
Aumann (1963), proceeds from preferences on a comprehensive set of acts. Speciﬁcally,
let S be the set of states of nature s and C be the set of pure consequences c. In Savage,
the set of acts F is the set of mappings f of S into C. In Anscombe-Aumann, it is the
set of probability distributions over F, say ∆(F). Yet, a standard decision problem calls
for the choice of some element from a proper subset of F, say the set R of alternatives
really open to choice. Additional acts, elements of F \R or ∆(F)\∆(R), are introduced for
analytical convenience, and for the strength of conclusions thereby reached: preferences are
represented by subjectively expected utility, with utility u deﬁned uniquely up to positive
linear transformations and subjective probability p deﬁned uniquely.
More recently, Aumann and Dr` eze (2005) – hereafter ASR – have presented a parallel
analysis for decision in games of strategy (GoS). They look at a game from the view-
point of a single player, called “the protagonist”; all other players are combined into a
single “opponent”. Let then S be the set of the opponent’s strategies s, R be the set of
the protagonist’s strategies r, and C be the set of possible outcomes of the game for the
protagonist. Each strategy r ∈ R deﬁnes a mapping hr of S into C. ASR proceeds from
complete preferences over ∆(R∪C) and derives a subjective-expected-utility representation
of these preferences. Utility is still unique up to positive linear transformations. Subjective
probability is in general not unique: there may exist several probabilities, like p and p0, such
that the expected utilities up(r) = Σsps u(hr(s)) and up0(r) = Σsp0
s u(hr(s)) are equal, for
each r ∈ R – a property labeled “eﬀective uniqueness” in ASR (section 6.2). In such cases,
preferences over ∆(R∪C) do not permit discrimination between p and p0. And such cases
arise when the matrix [u(hr(s)],r ∈ R, s ∈ S, has rank less than S – a situation avoided
under a comprehensive set of acts.1
The reason for entertaining preferences over ∆(R∪C) is twofold: (i) introducing hypo-
thetical strategies ˜ r 6∈ R changes the game, with potential consequences for preferences and
their expected-utility representation; (ii) R will typically fail to include constant strategies,
1F includes acts that “stake a prize” on a single state, and this feature applies to every s in S.
2with hr(s) = c ∀s ∈ S, some c ∈ C; accordingly, u(c) cannot be inferred from preferences
over ∆(R) alone; elements of ∆(R ∪ C), called “hybrid lotteries” in ASR, are introduced
to that end.2
The main theorem in ASR, hereafter MTASR, which asserts existence of a subjective-
expected-utility representation of preferences over ∆(R∪C) verifying eﬀective uniqueness,
is of course applicable to games against nature (GAN) as well – although the motivation
for restricting attention there to preferences over ∆(R∪C) instead of the full ∆(F) is less
compelling.3 Still, it is a useful result in that context, because the decision maker “might
have diﬃculty in forming meaningful preferences between highly hypothetical options” or
“might be reluctant to evaluate carefully acts that are clearly irrelevant”.4
In games of strategy, preferences over mixed strategies are meaningful: these are pre-
cisely the objects of choice open to the protagonist. Yet, these preferences are not “ob-
servable”, in particular not subject to (potentially) observable binary choices. The only
observable choices concern optimal strategies: the subset, say M ⊂ R, or ∆(M) ⊂ ∆(R),
some element of which the protagonist will actually play. Indeed, the protagonist must
choose some mixed strategy, and the set of preferred choices is ∆(M). Thus the deﬁnition
of M, and preferences over ∆(M ∪ C) are “operational” concepts. In fact, they are the
very concepts entertained, for a diﬀerent context, in the “revealed-preferences” theory of
Samuelson (1950) and his followers.
Under a more restrictive notion of “operationalism”, one might regard a single element
of M as “observable”, namely the pure strategy, say r∗, actually played by the protagonist.
The present paper develops this revealed-preferences approach to decision theory for
both GAN and GoS (section 2), and relates it to standard decision theory as well as
to ASR (section 3). Our main result, theorem 1, provides a subjective-expected-utility
representation based on axiomatisation of M and of preferences that are complete only on
∆(M ∪ C). Corollary 1 treats the case where preferences are complete only on ∆(r∗ ∪ C).
2That preferences over ∆(R) ∪ ∆(C) ⊂ ∆(R ∪ C) would not quite do is a subtle point not relevant to
our purpose here.
3In particular, adding hypothetical acts does not aﬀect nature’s choices.
4ASR, section 6.1. In particular, existence of a dominant strategy eliminates the need to assess alterna-
tives.
32 Main Result
We adopt the notation of ASR, and interpret it indiﬀerently for GAN’s or for GoS’s. A
game G consists of
• a ﬁnite set R with elements r (the pure strategies of the protagonist or the acts of
the decision maker),
• a ﬁnite set S with elements s (the pure strategies of the opponent or the states of
nature; states for short),
• a ﬁnite set C with elements c (pure consequences),
• a function h : R × S → C (the outcome function of the protagonist in a GoS or the
deﬁnition of the acts in a GAN).
Thus, G = (R,S,C,h). We write hr(s) for the consequence associated with the pair (r,s) ∈
R × S.
For a ﬁnite set A, the set of probability distributions on A is a denoted ∆(A), with
elements α. Thus, γ ∈ ∆(C) is a mixed consequence, and ρ ∈ ∆(R) is a mixed strategy in
a GoS or a lottery over acts in a GAN. By a slight abuse of notation, we write ρs for the
mixed consequence associated by ρ with state s. As for ∆(R ∪ C), with elements λ, it is
a set of hybrid lotteries deﬁned by triplets (ρλ,γλ,tλ) ∈ ∆(R) × ∆(C) × [0,1]. In state s,
the hybrid lottery λ entails the mixed consequence λs yielding ρλ
s with probability tλ and
γλ with probability (1 − tλ); so, we write λs = tρλ
s + (1 − t)γλ ∈ ∆(C).
In order to develop our “revealed preference” analysis, we start from a partial ordering
% on ∆(R∪C), which in particular separates a set of preferred mixed strategies ∆(M),M ⊆
R, from the remaining mixed strategies, ∆(R) \ ∆(M). The interpretation is that the
protagonist in the game G is indiﬀerent between playing any strategy ρ ∈ ∆(M)but will not
play any ρ0 ∈ ∆(R) \ ∆(M).
Four assumptions will deﬁne fully our partial ordering % on ∆(R∪C). By deﬁnition, %
is transitive and reﬂexive, but not necessarily complete; it embodies the usual deﬁnitions
of indiﬀerence (∼) and strict preference ().
4Assumption 1 There exists M ⊆ R,M 6= ∅, such that: ρ ∼ ρ0 ∀ ρ, ρ0 ∈ ∆(M) and
ρ  ρ0 ∀ ρ ∈ ∆(M),ρ0 ∈ ∆(R) \ ∆(M).
Assumption 1 amounts to the assertion that the protagonist is willing to play the game
(M 6= ∅), and reveals her full set of preferred strategies ∆(M).
Next, we deﬁne a complete preference ordering % on a set ∆(A) to be an N − M
preference ordering if it satisﬁes the standard axioms of utility theory, as stated for instance
in von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) or Luce and Raiﬀa (1957). And we deﬁne an
N − M utility on ∆(A) to be a real-valued u on ∆(A) such that, ∀ α, α0 ∈ ∆(A) and
∀ t ∈ [0,1],
• α % α0 iﬀ u(α) ≥ u(α0);
• u(tα + (1 − t)α0) = tu(α) + (1 − t) u(α0).
As is well known, and N − M preference admits an N − M utility representation.
Assumption 2 The restriction of % to ∆(M ∪ C) is an N − M preference.
Thus, on ∆(M ∪ C), the preference ordering is complete and admits an N − M utility
representation.
Assumption 3 For λ,λ0 ∈ ∆(R ∪ C), if λs % ()λ0
s ∀s ∈ S, then λ % ()λ0.
Assumption 3 introduces a condition of monotonicity which extends our partial preference
ordering to some elements of ∆(R ∪ C) \ ∆(M ∪ C), namely those elements among which
a preference domination holds. Note that λs % λ0
s is well deﬁned in view of assumption 2,
applied to ∆(C) ⊂ ∆(M ∪ C). Assumption 3 embodies the “reversal of order” condition
of Anscombe and Aumann (1963) and a weak form of the “sure-thing principle” of Savage
(1954).5
5Beside GAN and GoS, there exist one-person games where the occurence of the “states” is inﬂuenced
by the strategy choices of the decision maker. (Think about record-breaking performances in sports or
athletics.) Such games are called “games of strength and skill” by von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944);
they are called “games with moral hazard” by Dr` eze (1987), where strategies are not observable. In such
situations, “reversal of order” fails, and is replaced in Dr` eze (1987) by the weaker assumption of “non-
negative value of information”. No doubt, the developments in the present paper have a counterpart under
moral hazard; but we have not attempted to spell out that counterpart, which is apt to be complex. The
same remark applies for state-dependent preferences, the other generalisation covered in Dr` eze (1987).
5Assumptions 1-3 have an important implication, worth stating formally.
Proposition 1 Let ρ,ρ0,ρ00 ∈ ∆(R) be such that, for some t ∈ (0,1),ρs ∼ tρ0
s + (1 − t)ρ
00
s
for all s ∈ S; then, ρ ∈ ∆(M) if and only if ρ0 ∈ ∆(M) and ρ00 ∈ ∆(M).
Proof By assumption 3, ρ is indiﬀerent to ρ0 + (1 − t)ρ”. If ρ ∈ ∆(M), then ρ0 + (1 −
t)ρ” ∈ ∆(M). Accordingly, by assumption 2, ρ ∼ ρ0 and ρ ∼ ρ”, so that ρ0 ∈ ∆(M) and
ρ” ∈ ∆(M). Conversely, either ρ0 / ∈ ∆(M) or ρ” / ∈ ∆(M) implies ρ / ∈ ∆(M). 
This is a natural property: in GAN, ρ could not be part of the preferred set ∆(M) if
it is a convex combination (preference wise) of a preferred and a discarded strategy, or of
two discarded strategies. The status of this property in GoS is discussed in section 4.2.
Theorem 1 Under assumptions 1, 2 and 3, there exist:
• an N − M utility u on ∆(C),
• a non-empty convex set Γ ⊂ ∆(C) such that γ ∈ Γ and ρ ∈ ∆(M) imply γ ∼ ρ,
• a non-empty convex set P3 of probabilities on S such that, for all p ∈ P3:
(i) up(ρ) := Σs∈S ps u(ρs) = u(γ) ∀ρ ∈ ∆(M),γ ∈ Γ;
(ii) up(ρ) > up(ρ0) ∀ ρ ∈ ∆(M),ρ0 ∈ ∆(R) \ ∆(M).
This theorem establishes that the choice by the protagonist of the set M of preferred
strategies is sustained by a subjective expected utility analysis, where probabilities are
in general not unique, but satisfy eﬀective uniqueness over ∆(M). Indeed, (i) implies
u(γ) = up(ρ) = up0(ρ) ∀ p, p0 ∈ P3 and ρ ∈ ∆(M). Theorem 1 covers case 3 in the abstract
(hence the notation P3).
Proof of theorem 1 Assume w.l.o.g. that C contains γ,γ0 with γ  γ0. (Otherwise,
take u to be identically 0, and P3 the set of all probability distributions on S.)
From assumption 2, we obtain directly the utility u, which we normalize (arbitrarily),
and the set Γ. Next, we eliminate temporarily from consideration any state ˆ s ∈ S such
6that there exist ρ ∈ ∆(R),ρ0 ∈ ∆(M) with ρs % ρ0
s ∀s and ρˆ s  ρ0
ˆ s.6 Indeed, it will be the
case that pˆ s = 0 ∀ p ∈ P3. Denote by ¯ S the set of remaining states, i.e. those not thereby
eliminated.
Convention: for the rest of this proof, we represent a hybrid lottery λ by the ¯ S-vector of
the (expected) utilities u(λs) of its mixed consequences in states s ∈ ¯ S. Thus, λ is a point
in Euclidean ¯ S-space <
¯ S.
Preference relations among consequences are thus replaced by inequalities among util-
ities; every hybrid lottery in ∆(R ∪ C) is deﬁned by a point in <
¯ S; and every γ ∈ ∆(C)
is a point on the main diagonal of <
¯ S. We henceforth write ˜ γ for the unique point of the
main diagonal of <
¯ S corresponding to Γ. As for ∆(R), it is a convex compact set in <
¯ S.
The proof of theorem 1 rests on the concept of “admissibility”, introduced in Arrow et
al. (1953).
Deﬁnition 1 Let A,B be convex sets in <
¯ S with A ⊆ B. Then A is an admissible set for
B if and only if there do not exist λ ∈ A,λ0 ∈ B with λ0 > λ. 7
Lemma 1 ∆(M) is an admissible set for ∆(R).
Proof Using assumptions 1 and 3, and the deﬁnition of ¯ S, if ρ ∈ ∆(M), then there does
not exist ρ0 ∈ ∆(R) with ρ0 > ρ. Thus ∆(M) is an admissible set for ∆(R). 
An alternative statement of lemma 1 is: for every ρ ∈ ∆(M),{ρ + <
¯ S
+} ∩ ∆(R) = {ρ}.
We now consider the sets of hybrid lotteries ∆(M ∪ Γ) and ∆(R ∪ Γ) ∈ <
¯ S. These
subsets of ∆(M ∪ C) and ∆(R ∪ C) respectively correspond to the convex hulls of the
union M, respectively R, with the point ˜ γ on the main diagonal of <
¯ S deﬁning the utility
of a mixed consequence indiﬀerent to playing the game G.
The properties of ∆(M) ⊆ ∆(R) also hold for ∆(M ∪ Γ) ⊆ ∆(R ∪ Γ), in particular
proposotion 1 and lemma 1.
Lemma 2 Let λ,λ0,λ00 ∈ ∆(R ∪ Γ) be such that, for some τ ∈ (0,1),
6Of course, ρ as deﬁned also belongs to ∆(M).
7Notation: ρ
0 ≥ ρ if ρ
0
s ≥ ρs ∀ s;ρ
0 > ρ if ρ
0 ≥ ρ and ρ
0 6= ρ;ρ
0  ρ if ρ
0
s > ρs ∀s.
7λs = τλ0
s + (1 − τ)λ00
s ∀s ∈ ¯ S; then, λ ∈ ∆(M ∪ Γ) if and only if λ0 ∈ ∆(M ∪ Γ) and
λ00 ∈ ∆(M ∪ Γ).
Proof With λ = tρ + (1 − t)˜ γ,λ0 := t0ρ0 + (1 − t0)˜ γ and λ = τλ0 + (1 − τ)λ00, let
ˆ τ := τt0+(1−τ)t00 ∈ (0,1) and ˆ ρ =
τt0ρ0+(1−τ)t”ρ”
ˆ τ , so that λ = ˆ τ ˆ ρ+(1−ˆ τ)˜ γ. If λ ∈ ∆(M∪Γ)
so that λ ∼ ρ ∼ ˜ γ, then λ ∼ ˆ τρ+(1− ˆ τ)γ ∼ ˆ τ ˆ ρ+(1− ˆ ρ)˜ γ implying ρ ∼ ˆ ρ. By proposition
1, ρ ∈ ∆(M) if and only if ρ0,ρ00 ∈ ∆(M) hence λ0,λ00 ∈ ∆(M ∪ Γ). 
Lemma 3 ∆(M ∪ Γ) is an admissible set for ∆(R ∪ Γ).
Proof Let λ ∈ ∆(M ∪ Γ),λ0 ∈ ∆(R ∪ Γ) \ ∆(M ∪ Γ) with λ0 = t0ρ0 + (1 − t0)˜ γ > λ =
tρ+(1−t)˜ γ ∼ t0ρ+(1−t0)˜ γ. This implies ρ0 % ρ, contradicting λ0 ∈ ∆(R∪Γ)\∆(M∪Γ). 
An alternative statement of lemma 3 is: for every λ ∈ ∆(M∪Γ), {λ+<
¯ S
+}∩∆(R∪Γ) = {λ}.
Lemma 4 Either ∆(M) = ∆(R) or ∆(M ∪ Γ) ∩ ri∆(R ∪ Γ) = ∅.
where ri stands for “relative interior”.
Proof Let ∆(R)\∆(M) 6= ∅. If ∆(M ∪Γ) is a singleton (γ), then it is an extreme point
of ∆(R∪Γ) and the lemma is true. Otherwise, let λ ∈ ∆(M ∪Γ),λ0 ∈ ∆(R∪Γ)\∆(M ∪Γ).
If λ ∈ ri ∆(R ∪ Γ), there exists µ > 1 such µλ + (1 − µ)λ0 := λ00 ∈ ∆(R ∪ Γ) (Rockafellar,
1970, theorem 6.4); and there exists τ = 1
µ ∈ (0,1) such that λ = τλ0 + (1 − τ)λ00. But
lemma 2 then implies λ0 ∈ ∆(M ∪ Γ), a contradiction. 
To prove theorem 1, let then M∗ := ∪λ∈∆(M∪Γ) {λ + <
¯ S
+}, a convex set. By lemma
3 and lemma 4, ri M∗ ∩ ri ∆(R ∪ Γ) = ∅. Accordingly there exists a hyperplane, say B
separating M∗ from ∆(R∪Γ) (Rockafellar, 1970, theorem 11.3), and containing ∆(M∪Γ) =
M∗∩∆(R∪Γ). Accordingly, there exists a normal vector to B, say ¯ p, with ¯ p > 0, Σs∈¯ S ¯ ps =
1, ¯ pλ = ¯ pλ0 ∀ λ,λ0 ∈ ∆(M ∪Γ) and ¯ pλ > ¯ pλ0 ∀ λ ∈ ∆(M ∪Γ), λ0 ∈ ∆(R∪Γ)\∆(M ∪Γ).
Denote by ¯ P3 the set of all vectors in <
¯ S
+ verifying these four properties. We have just
shown that ¯ P3 is non-empty. Also, ¯ P3 is convex because each of the four deﬁning properties
is preserved under convex combinations.8
8Actually ¯ P3 is (i) the union of the normal cones to the set of hyperplanes containing ∆(M) and
separating ∆(R) from {x + R
¯ S
+,x ∈ ∆(M)}, (ii) intersected with the unit simplex of <
¯ S
+.
8Abandoning our convention, let P3 ⊂ <S be the set of vectors p deﬁned by :
∃ ¯ p ∈ ¯ P3, p¯ S = ¯ p; ps = 0 ∀ s ∈ S \ ¯ S. That is, the restriction of ˆ P3 to <
¯ S is given by ¯ P3
and the restriction of P3 to <S\¯ S is the zero vector. Then P3 satisﬁes conclusions (i) and
(ii) of theorem 1. 
Remark It is not claimed that P3 is closed. For instance, if ∆(M) is an extreme point of
∆(R), P3 does not include the vectors normal to the faces of ∆(R) adjacent to the extreme
point.
3 Nested Identiﬁcation of Subjective Probabilities
3.1
To cover case 4 in the abstract, we now state and prove the corollary to theorem 1 holding
when assumptions 1 and 2 are weakened as follows.
Assumption 1* There exists r∗ ∈ < such that r∗ % ρ ∀ ρ ∈ ∆(R).
Assumption 2* The restriction of % to ∆(r∗ ∪ C) is an N-M preference.
Corollary 1 Under assumptions 1*, 2* and 3 there exist:
• an N-M utility u on ∆(C).
• a non-empty convex set Γ ⊂ ∆(C) such that γ ∈ Γ implies γ ∼ r∗,
• a non-empty convex set P4 of probabilities on S,P4 ⊇ P3, such that, for all p ∈ P4 :
(i) up(r∗) = Σs∈S psu(r∗
s) = u(γ) ∀ γ ∈ Γ :
(ii) up(r∗) ≥ up(ρ) ∀ ρ ∈ ∆(R).
Proof Repeating step by step the reasoning in the proof of theorem 1, with M systemat-
ically replaced by {r∗}, we obtain successively the N −M utility u on ∆(C), the set Γ and
a non-empty convex set of probabilities P4 satisfying conclusions (i) and (ii) of corollary 1.
Furthermore, P4 ⊇ P3 because every p ∈ P3 satisﬁes conclusions (i) and (ii) in corollary 1,
and P4 is comprehensive. 
Remark When r∗ is a dominant strategy, P4 is the unit simplex of <S (and ¯ S∗ = S).
93.2
Turning to case 2 in the abstract, ASR rests on assumption 3 and
Assumption 2’ There is an N − M preference % on ∆(R ∪ C).
Theorem 2 Under assumptions 2’ and 3, there exist
• an N-M utility on ∆(C),
• a non-empty convex set P2 ⊆ P3 such that, for all λ,λ0 ∈ ∆(R ∪ C), λ % λ0 iﬀ, for
each p ∈ P2, up(λ) ≥ up(λ0),
• for all λ ∈ ∆(R ∪ C), for all p,p0 ∈ P2,up(λ) = up0(λ).
Proof See main theorem and section 6.2 in ASR. That P2 is convex follows from up(λ) ≡
up0(λ). That P2 ⊆ P3 follows from the facts that every p ∈ P2 veriﬁes conclusions (i) and
(ii) of theorem 1, at unchanged u and Γ; and P3 is comprehensive. 
Theorem 3 When ∆(R) ⊂ <
¯ S owns an indiﬀerence class spanning an (¯ S−1)-dimensional
hyperplane, then P2 is a singleton; when the indiﬀerence class ∆(M) has that property, P3
is a singleton, hence P3 = P2 = {˜ p}.
Proof An (S − 1)-dimensional hyperplane in <
¯ S has a unique normal vector. 
Remark If R is comprehensive, i.e. owns every map of S into C, then ∆(R) owns
indiﬀerence classes spanning (¯ S − 1)-dimensional (parallel) hyperplanes. That suﬃcient
condition is not necessary, however.
4 Conclusions
In GAN, one can apply the N − M axioms to preferences over four nested sets, namely
∆(r∗∪C), ∆(M∪C), ∆(R∪C) and ∆(F) ≡ ∆(F ∪C) – thereby obtaining four nested sets
of subjective probabilities, P4,P3, P2 and the singleton {˜ p}. There exist special situations
where P4 = P3 = P2 = {p}. In general, the set inclusions are proper: P4 ⊃ P3 ⊃ P2 ⊃ {˜ p}.
10The standard analysis, based on ∆(F), brings out the logic of subjective-expected-
utility analysis in the most demanding case: when P3 = {˜ p}, precise assessment of prob-
abilities is needed to solve the decision problem. Yet, typical decision situations are less
demanding. The sets P4 and P3 then deﬁne the extent to which probabilities need be speciﬁed
in order to sustain an optimal decision.
By way of illustration, let S = {s,t} and R = {r,r0,r00} where the three acts r,r0,r00




3) in states (s,t). Then r % r0 iﬀ
ps ≥ 3
5 and r0 % r00 iﬀ ps ≥ 2
5. The information about ps needed to choose an optimal
act amounts to locating ps relative to the interval [2
5, 3
5] This is less demanding than point
estimation.
In the same illustration, assume that M = {r0} = {(1,1)}. Then, P3 = (2
5, 3
5). Assume
further (assumption 2’) that r ∼ (11
12, 11
12). Then P2 = {˜ p} = {1
2}.
Assuming instead that M = {r}, and r ∼ (9
8, 9
8), then P3 = P2 = {˜ p} = 3
4. In GoS,
there are only three nested sets over which preferences are meaningfully deﬁned, namely
∆(r∗∪C), ∆(M∪C) and ∆(R∪C); the corresponding nested sets of subjective probabilities
are P4,P3 ⊆ P2 and P2 ⊆ P3. But only P4 and P3 reﬂect observable preferences.
The nature of preferences among pure or mixed strategies in GoS is discussed at some
length in ASR. A signiﬁcant comment is related to assumption 4. Consider the simple two-
person, zero-sum game of “matching pennies”, where r ∈ {1,2},s ∈ {1,2}, and hr(s) = 1
for r = s, hr(s) = −1 for r 6= s. What ultimately matters to each player in this game is
that the opponent not be able to “guess” what he himself will play. That is, each player
wants his opponent to assign equal probabilities to both of his own strategies. A simple
way of achieving that goal is to adopt the mixed strategy (1
2, 1
2). The clear decision by
a player to play according to that mixed strategy might be construed as a violation of
assumption 4, because the pure strategies “heads” or “tail” appear discarded in favor of
the mixed strategy. It is simply
The proper interpretation of assumption 4 is diﬀerent. It is simply claimed that a
player adopting the mixed strategy (1
2, 1
2) thereby reveals indiﬀerence between eventually
playing “head” or “tail”. Such indiﬀerence is consistent with the assignment of equal
11probabilities to the opponent playing “head” or “tail”, and diﬃcult to reconcile with any
other assignment. Assumption 4 claims neither more nor less.
In every game situation, a full analysis of the game is needed to form reasonable ex-
pectations about the choice(s) of an opponent. We argue here that, under reasonable
assumptions, these expectations admit a subjective probability representation, sustaining
the retained strategy(ies) as maximising expected utility. The role of game theory in guid-
ing expectations in GoS is then seen as logically equivalent to that of (Bayesian) statistics
in GAN.
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